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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE
PLAINTIFF
V

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.,
a Maine corporation, AND
DONALD GLIDDEN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT

DEFENDANTS
I.
1.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action under the Unfair Trade Practices

Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214 (1989 and Supp. 1992), and the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661-4671 (1989
& Supp. 1992) to obtain declaratory relief, a preliminary and
permanent injunction prohibiting Trade Winds Marketing, Inc.,
and Donald Glidden (hereinafter referred to as "Defendants")
from engaging in unfair and deceptive conduct, an accounting,
restitution, and civil penalties.
2.

Defendants operate a nationwide telemarketing

operation that sells merchandise of nominal value by means of
fraudulent representations to consumers, most of whom are
elderly.

Defendants use false representations, described in

detail below, to induce consumers to spend between $399 and
$699 to purchase Defendants' merchandise, which consists
primarily of inexpensive products of marginal quality with a
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retail value of substantially less than the amount of money
paid by the consumer.
II.
3.

PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Plaintiff, State of Maine, a sovereign state, by and

through the Attorney General, commences this action under
5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214 (1989 & Supp. 1992), commonly known as
the Unfair Trade Practices Act, and 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661-4671
(1989 & Supp. 1992), commonly known as the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act, to protect the public by preventing and
restraining Defendants from engaging in violations of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Solicitation Sales
Act.
4.

Defendant Trade Winds Marketing, Inc. is a corporation

duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Maine with a
principal place of business in Auburn, Maine.
5.

Defendant Donald Glidden is the president of Trade

Winds Marketing, Inc.

Defendant Glidden is a resident of

Lisbon Falls, Androscoggin County, Maine.
6.

This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to

14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A(2).
7.

Venue is proper in Kennebec County pursuant to

5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
III.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Unfair Trade Practice Act
8.

The operative provision of the Unfair Trade Practices

Act ("UTPA"), 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, renders it unlawful to engage
in any unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
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any trade or commerce.

Intentional violations of the UTPA are

subject to a penalty of up to $10,000 per violation.
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act
9.

The Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A.

§§ 4661-4671, provides the statutory framework for the
regulation of the sale of merchandise which is accomplished in
connection with or as a result of a salesman's direct contact,
including but not limited to a personal visit or telephone call
to a consumer, at a place other than the salesman's place of
business, when the initial contact is unsolicited by the
consumer.

32 M.R.S.A. § 4662.

Games of Chance
10.
chance.

17 M.R.S.A. § 331 prohibits all unlicensed games of
Games of chance are defined as "a game, contest,

scheme or device in which a person stakes or risks something of
value for an opportunity to win something of value and in which
the outcome depends in a material degree upon an element of
chance..."

17 M.R.S.A. § 330(2).

to eligible organizations.

17 M.R.S.A. § 332(1).
IV.

11.

Licenses can be granted only

FACTS

In September of 1992, Defendant Trade Winds Marketing,

Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant Trade Winds"),
began operations as a telemarketing business in Auburn, Maine.
Defendant Glidden is the founder and president of Defendant
Trade Winds and is responsible for the overall supervision and
operation of the company.
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12.

In the course of Defendant Trade Winds7 telemarketing

business, Defendant Glidden employs and supervises a general
manager as well as telephone salespeople.

Defendant Glidden

and his employees solicit consumers by telephone, on behalf of
Defendant Trade Winds, on a nationwide basis and inform them
that they have been selected to receive a "major award" or "top
prize".
13.

Defendants and their agents inform solicited consumers

that they are "guaranteed" to receive one of five "major
awards":

$5,000 in cash, a grandfather clock, a 9-piece lead

crystal set with gold trim, an audio rack or $1,500 in cash.
Defendants consistently represent to consumers that the
consumers have won the $5,000 cash prize.
statements include the following:

Defendants7

"You're at the top!", "I

wouldn't throw away $5,000!", "You hit it big!", and "I can't
tell you what it is, but I'm holding it in my hand and it
doesn't get any better than this!".

Defendants' statements are

intended to deceive consumers into believing that they have won
the $5,000 award.
14.

Defendants next inform the solicited consumer that in

order to receive the "guaranteed major award", the consumer
must pay $699 to purchase a Gift Ensemble of merchandise
selected by Defendants and join Defendants' "club".

Defendants

will negotiate a lower price if the consumer balks at the $699
price, but will typically accept no less than $399.

In the

course of the solicitation, Defendants represent that upon
payment of the agreed upon sum, in addition to the Gift
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Ensemble and the "major award", the consumer will also receive
"free gifts" for one year.

The "free gifts" offered by

Defendants represent the sole benefit of membership in the
"club".
15.

In reality, the money paid by consumers substantially

exceeds the combined retail values of the "major award", the
Gift Ensemble of merchandise, and the "free gifts" throughout
the year.
16.

Despite the fact that Defendants represent that the

"major award" is something of substantial value that the
consumer has "won", the award received by the consumer is not
of substantial value and the consumer directly pays for the
award with the money paid to Defendants.
17.

Similarly, despite the fact the Defendants represent

that the consumer will receive "free gifts" throughout the
year, the money sent to Defendants by consumers to pay for the
purchase of the Gift Ensemble and club membership also pays for
the "free gifts".
18.

In reliance on Defendants' misrepresentations, the

consumer's principal motivation in agreeing to pay money is
receipt of the "major award", most notably the $5,000.

For

example, one consumer who had first been told by Defendant
Glidden that she "shouldn't throw away $5,000" received the
comparatively inexpensive lead crystal set as her "major
award."
19.

Despite the fact that Defendants intentionally create

the false impression that the consumer is destined to win the
$5,000, no consumer has yet to be awarded the $5,000 prize.
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20.

After an oral agreement is reached with the consumer

during the telephone solicitation, Defendants arrange for
Federal Express or other overnight courier to pick the check up
at the consumer's residence, usually within a few hours of the
telephone solicitation.
21.

Consumers do not receive a written contract to review

and sign until after their money has been delivered by courier
to the Defendants.
22.

The contract subsequently sent by Defendants does not

set fully set forth the terms of the oral agreement reached
during the telephone solicitation.

While the contract does

contain notification of the consumer's three day right to
cancel the transaction, it is often not received by the
consumer until three days have passed since the money was paid.
23.

Consumers who paid money to Defendants in the first

"promotion" are next resolicited or "reloaded" by Defendants.
Defendants contact those consumers and inform them that, if
they purchase additional merchandise from Defendants, they will
be eligible to win a "top prize" of a 1993 Chevy Cavalier or
$10,000, a home video entertainment system, a twenty-piece
heavy-weight stainless steel cookware set, or a $2,500
cashier's check.

The money typically solicited from a consumer

during this second round of "promotion" ranges from $1,000 to
$1,999.
24.

As in the first promotion, the retail value of the

merchandise which the consumer must purchase in order to
receive the "major award" is substantially less than the amount
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of money paid by the consumer.

Despite Defendants'

representations that the consumer has won the car or the money,
the vast majority of consumers receive a "top prize" of minimal
value worth substantially less than the amount of money paid by
the consumer.
25.

As an alternative to the scheme of requiring consumers

to purchase a club membership, Defendants also make one-time
sales to consumers of either a desk ensemble (in the first
promotion) or a kitchen set (to re-loaded consumers in the
second promotion).

In the course of the one-time sale

promotions, Defendants make misrepresentations to consumers
similar to those made by Defendants in the course of its other
solicitations in order to entice the consumer to send between
$399 and $699 to Defendants.
26.

Similar to the other promotions offered by Defendants,

the retail value of the merchandise sold by Defendants in the
course of the one time sale is substantially less than the
amount of money paid by the consumer.

The retail value of the

"major award" actually received by consumers is also
substantially less than the amount of money paid by the
consumer.
27.

Defendants misrepresentations described above are

intentional.
28.

Defendants do not have a license to operate a lottery

or game of chance.
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29.

Defendants, from their place of business in Auburn,

Androscoggin County, Maine, are currently soliciting consumers
throughout the United States to participate in their promotions.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Misrepresentation)
30.

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein

by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 of this Complaint.
31.

Defendants' conduct as described in this Complaint

constitutes deceptive and unfair acts and practices in the
conduct of trade or commerce in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207
and 32 M.R.S.A. § 4671, including, but not limited to,
misrepresentations that
A.

Consumers have won a "major award";

B.

The "major award" is free upon the purchase of

merchandise from Defendants;
C.

The "major award" is an item of substantial value;

D.

The consumer has, in fact, won the $5,000 award;

E.

The items in the gift pack purchased by consumers in

return for joining the "club" are of substantial value;
F.

The "major award" and the items in the gift pack are

of greater or equal value than the money paid by consumers
to join the "club";
G.

That consumers will receive "free" gifts upon joining

the "club".
32.

Defendants' conduct as described in this cause of

action is intentional.

33.

Defendants' conduct as described in this Complaint

constitutes unfair and deceptive acts and practices in
violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 and 32 M.R.S.A. § 4671.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Consumer Solicitation Sales Act)
34.

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein

by reference paragraphs 1 through 33 of this Complaint.
35.

Defendants fail to provide a written contract prior to

payment by the consumer of the contracted amount.
36.

Defendants' written contract does not fully set forth

the terms of the agreement entered into with consumers.
37.

Defendants fail to provide consumers with notification

of their three-day right to cancel in a timely manner.
38.

Defendants' conduct as described herein is intentional.

39.

Defendants' conduct as described in this Complaint

constitutes unfair and deceptive acts and practices and a
violation of the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, in violation
of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 and 32 M.R.S.A. § 4671.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Games of Chance)
40.

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein

by reference paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Complaint.
41.

Defendants are operating a game of chance by running a

contest or scheme in which consumers stake or risk something of
value for an opportunity to win something of value where the
outcome depends on an element of chance.
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42.

Defendants' conduct as described in this Complaint

constitutes the operation of an unlicensed game of chance in
violation of 17 M.R.S.A. § 331.
43.

Defendants' conduct as described herein is intentional

44.

Defendants' conduct in enticing consumers to

participate in an illegal game of chance constitutes an unfair
and deceptive act or practice in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiff requests this Court to enter the following relief
1.

Declare that Defendants have violated 5 M.R.S.A. § 207

(1989 and Supp. 1992) by engaging in a pattern and practice of
unfair and deceptive conduct in the course of their
telemarketing business.
2.

Declare that Defendants have violated 32 M.R.S.A.

§ 4671 and 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 by failing to provide consumers
with:
A. a written contract prior to collection of
consumers' money by Defendants;
B. a written contract which fully sets forth the terms
of the agreement entered into with the consumer; and
C. timely notice of the consumer's right to cancel the
transaction within three business days.
3.

Enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants,

their agents, assigns, successors or anyone acting under their
control from:
A.

Violating any provision of the Unfair Trade Practices

Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214; and
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B.

Violating any provision of the Consumer Solicitation

Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661-4671.
C.

Violating any provision of the Games of Chance Act,

14 M.R.S.A. §§ 330-346.
4.

Order Defendants to provide an accounting of the name,

address and amount of money paid by each consumer who sent
money to Defendants in response to their solicitation.
5.

Order Defendants to pay restitution to each consumer

who sent money to Defendants in response to their solicitation.
6.

Order Defendants to pay to the Department of the

Attorney General the costs of suit and investigation, including
attorney's fees.
7.

Order Defendants to pay to the Department of the

Attorney General, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 civil penalties
in the amount not to exceed $10,000 for each intentional
violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
8.

Order such other relief as may be necessary to

ameliorate the effects of Defendants' unfair and deceptive
practices.

Dated at Augusta, Maine this __nd day of April, 1993.

MICHAEL E. CARPENTER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

i '

Assisuanp Attorney General
Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800

COLLEEN J . QUINT
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-93-156

/
STATE OF MAINE,
/
PLAINTIFF
VS

/

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
CONTINUE

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC., /
and DONALD GLIDDEN,
/
DEFENDANTS
/

RECD-ÛHLED
Na n c y a
A.. OESJARDIN

M

5 0 1993

KENNEBEC COUNTY

NOW come the Defendants, through counsel, and move to
continue the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
presently scheduled for August 3, 1993, for the following
reasons:
1. The undersigned attorney and the attorney
for the State, Colleen Quint, Assistant Attorney
General, mutually agree that this matter should be
continued.
2. Defendants have informed Attorney Quint
that they are no longer represented by the under
signed counsel but have yet to so notify under
signed counsel.
3. Defendants' undersigned counsel of record
is filing herewith a motion to withdraw as counsel
which needs to be acted upon before the pending
Motion to Dismiss can properly be heard.
4. Defendants have apparently, without the
involvement or advice of their counsel of record,
signed a consent decree which is in the possession
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of the Attorney General's Office pending further
receipt of a settlement amount apparently also
agreed upon without the knowledge, advice or
involvement of Defendants' undersigned counsel.
5.
Counsel of record for all parties agree
that the pending Motion to Dismiss is likely to be
withdrawn when and if the Consent Decree referred
to above is actually finalized. In the meantime, it
makes little sense for Defendants' counsel of record
to proceed with argument on the Motion to Dismiss
when Defendants themselves may not wish to have
their counsel of record do so. Defendants have ceased
communicating with their counsel of record and there
is a substantial question as to the extent to which he
continues to be authorized to act on their behalf.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned counsel moves that the
existing Motion to Dismiss be continued for the reasons
expressed herein.
DATED: July 29, 1993

s yg

// WL 3 0 1993

Coleman G. Coyne, Jr.
~7J ~/j CLERK OF COURTS
Attorney of Record for Defendants KENNEBEC COUNTY
Murphy & Coyne
93 Lisbon Street
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. C JJ

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

/
/
STATE OF MAINE
/
PLAINTIFF
VS

/

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC., /
ET AL,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
JOIN NECESSARY PARTIES
(M.R.Civ.P. Rules-12,
19)

NOW comes the Defendants and move, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(7) to dismiss this action on the grounds that
Plaintiff has failed to join necessary parties and failed to
comply with the provisions of Rule 19 M.R.Civ.P. regarding
stating the reasons for non-joinder of such parties.
In support of this motion, Defendants rely upon the
Memorandum of Law provided herewith and the complaint
already filed by Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the action be
dismissed, and that they be awarded their costs.
DATED:

April 20, 1993

}

'(Coleman G. Coyne, Jr.
f
Attorney for Defendants !s
Murphy & Coyne
93 Lisbon Street, Lewiston, Me

04240
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
PLAINTIFF

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

/
/

VS
/
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC. ,
ET AL,
/
DEFENDANTS

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

/

Plaintiff's complaint refers to numerous unnamed
"consumers" who have allegedly done business with
Defendants. Plaintiff has not identified any of these"'
consumers nor joined them in this action. Nor has Plaintiff
stated in its pleading any reasons why such parties are not
joined.
Rule 19(c) M.R.Civ.P. states as follows:
A pleading asserting
ting a claim for relief
shall state the names,, if known to the pleader,
n r i h p r l in
i n sub-division
cmVi— i v i <5i o n ((a)
pi
of any persons as described
(1) — (2) hereof who are not jointed, and the
reasons why they are not joined.

./

/rSNrv
■>

•Ct'O' V

Although Plaintiff's complaint purports to seek relief
on behalf of such unnamed individuals, Plaintiff has made no
attempt to comply with these provisions of the Rule.
Plaintiff has not stated the name of any such person and
Plaintiff has not stated the reasons for not joining such
individuals.
The unnamed individuals clearly are parties
contemplated by Rule 19(a) M.R.Civ.P. According to
Plaintiff's complaint, these are people who were solicited
by telephone by Defendants (Complaint, P.12) who believed
they were going to receive $5,000 from Defendants
(Complaint, P.13), who paid Defendants money in excess of the
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value they received (Complaint, p. 15), and who were
primarily motivated by the expectation of receiving $5,000
instead of merchandise (Complaint, P. 18). Plaintiff
further has alleged that these consumers did not receive
proper written documentation regarding their contract
(Complaint, p. 21) and that certain alleged facts were
misrepresented to these individuals (Complaint, P. 7).
In Plaintiff's prayer for relief, Plaintiff asks for
restitution to each such customer or perhaps even every
customer who has ever done any business with Defendants.
The specific request contained in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's
prayer for relief is that the court, "order Defendants to
pay restitution to each consumer who sent money to
Defendants in response to their solicitation."
Clearly, the individuals mentioned but unidentified by
Plaintiff are people who may or may not have an independent
cause of action against Defendants. Defendants have pointed
out elsewhere their continuing unsuccessful effort to have
Plaintiff disclose the names of unsatisfied customers.
(See, e .g., Defendants' Memorandum and Affidavit in Support
of Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte Attachment). To date,
Plaintiff has failed to do so and Defendants therefore have
no way of knowing which customers seek their money back and
which customers wish to keep the items they purchased from
Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff has brought this action
without naming or joining any such individuals and, with a
rather broad brush, asks that Defendants be subjected to
liability for restitution to each and every customer
Defendants have ever done business with.
If in fact certain individuals claim to have been
defrauded by alleged misrepresentations committed by
Defendants, Defendants are exposed to "a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent
obligations" to such individuals and to the Plaintiff in
this action. The Rule in such cases imposes upon Plaintiff
the obligation to name such individuals, if known.
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Presumably, Plaintiff knows the identities of dissatisfied
individuals.

The Rule also requires that Plaintiff plead

affirmatively the reasons why such individuals have not been
joined. In this case, Plaintiff has not complied with
either requirement.
As can be seen from Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants1 business is conducted on a
"nationwide" basis. (Complaint, p. 2). In State ex rel,
Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981), the Law
Court noted the unfairness and difficulty of forcing an
interstate business to defend suits in fifty states. (436
A.2d at 875). The same principle applies in the present
case. If Plaintiff in this case is seeking restitution on
behalf of unnamed individuals in all other States, those
individuals should either be joined or left to pursue their
own actions. In either event, it is inappropriate for
Plaintiff to purport to represent such individuals without
joining them, without naming them and without explaining
valid reasons for not joining them as is required by the
Rule.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully

LA W O F F I C E S - M U R P H Y A N D C O Y N E - 9 3 L IS B O N S T R E E T - L E W IS T O N . M A IN E 0 4 2 4 0

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE
Plaintiff

)
)

V

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.
ET A L .,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)

EX PARTE ORDER
APPROVING ATTACHMENT

Upon written Motion, Affidavits, the Complaint and
Certificate, the Court finds that it is more likely than not
that in this action
the Plaintiff will recover judgment against Defendants,
including civil penalties and costs, in an amount equal to or
greater than five hundred thousand ($500,000); that Defendants
possess no other ■assuraiwo, bond, or other security which is
available to satisfy any such judgment; and that there are no
other properties or other credits attached by other writs of
attachments or by trustees process by which to satisfy any
judgment which may be rendered in favor of Plaintiff.

The Court further finds that there is a clear danger that
the Defendants, if notified in advance of attachment of the
property, will remove property from the State or will cancel it
or will otherwise make it unavailable to satisfy a judgment.

2

THEREFORE, it is ORDERED ex parte that attachment may be
made against the property of Defendants, Trade Wind Marketing,
Inc., and Donald Glidden to wit:

money located in accounts of

financial institutions (including banks and ctedit unions)
t
located in the State of Maine, including, but not limited to,
the account located at Lisbon Community Federal Credit Union,
and motor vehicles owned by Defendants in the amount of
$500,000.

Dated: ( ~— ^
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC
ET Mi-,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

The State of Maine now moves for a Preliminary Injunction
in this action enjoining Defendants, their agents, employees,
assigns, successors, or anyone acting under their control from
any continuing of further effort to solicit consumers to send
money or other consideration to Defendants.
The grounds in support of this Motion are set forth in
Plaintiff's Complaint and in the Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.

Dated
COLI
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, ME 04333
Tel. (207) 626-8800

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.,
et a l .,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION

In this action, the.State of Maine seeks preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief, together with an accounting and
restitution, to remedy violations of the Unfair Trade Practices
Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 and the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act,
32 M.R.S.A. § 4662.

The State is filing a Motion.for

Preliminary Injunction with the Complaint.

The purposes of the

Motion is to prevent Defendants Trade Winds Marketing, Inc..and
Donald Glidden ("Defendants") from further subjecting consumers
nationwide to théir unfair and deceptive practices.
The Complaint in this action, and the pending Motion, have
arisen in the context of a nationwide fraudulent telemarketing
operation that preys primarily upon senior citizens.
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FACTS
The facts set forth in the Complaint and Affidavits filed
herewith present a particularly blatant example of a scheme
designed to separate consumers, more notably senior citizens,
from their money.

Specifically, as described in detail below,

Defendants use misrepresentations to induce consumers to send
to Defendants sums of money ranging from $399 to $1,999 in
exchange for which the consumer is guaranteed to receive
valuable merchandise and a "major award" from Defendants.

In

fact, the money paid by consumers far exceeds the value of the
merchandise promised to them by Defendants.
Defendants solicit consumers by telephone and inform them
that they have won a "major award" in the course of a promotion
being conducted by Defendants.

Defendants describe to

consumers the five major awards being handed out by Defendants,
one of which the consumer is guaranteed to receive.

Only after

informing the consumer that he or she has definitely won one of
the five "major awards" do Defendants mention to the consumer
that in order to obtain the prize which they have already won,
the consumer- must purchase merchandise from the Defendants at a
cost of $699.00
Defendants justify their request for money on the premise
that the consumer must be an "active customer" of Defendants in
order for Defendants to legally present the major award to the
consumer.

Defendants' implication that it is a business with

regular customers constitutes a misrepresentation intended to
create a false impression that Defendants operate a legitimate
business that is actually conducting a promotional event.

In

3
fact, Defendants' sole enterprise consists of soliciting
consumers, informing them that they have won a major award, and
then requesting money for the sale of junk merchandise that is
valued at substantially less than the amount requested from the
consumer.
The merchandise sold by Defendants to consumers, the "Gift
Ensemble" consists of merchandise valued at substantially less
than the amount of money solicited from the consumer.

Contrary

to Defendants' representations, the merchandise provided to
consumers are not quality gift items, but are of nominal value
only.

The "Gift Ensemble" typically consists of a watch set,

money clip, dictionary and vase or other miscellaneous desk
items, such a pen sets and calculators.
The major awards which the consumers are guaranteed by
Defendants to receive are also of nominal value.

The amounts

of money paid by consumers to receive the Gift Ensemble and the
major award greatly exceed the retail value of the merchandise
provided by Defendants.
After Defendants have made an initial solicitation to a
consumer and the consumer has agreed to send money to Defendant
in exchange for merchandise and a major award, Defendants
frequently "reload" the consumer.

Specifically, Defendants

continue to contact the consumer in an effort to solicit
additional funds in exchange for yet another "major award".
Often times, the consumer has yet to receive the merchandise or
the major award from the first solicitation and is unaware of
the shoddy nature of Defendants' merchandise.

4
If a consumer agrees to send money to Defendants,
Defendants arrange to have Federal Express pick up a check from
the consumer within approximately 2 hours of the solicitation.
Recently, Federal Express has begun to insist that the consumer
arrange for its pick up.

Defendants instruct the consumer to

contact Federal Express and then Defendants call the consumer
back a few minutes later to make sure the pick up has been
arranged.

Defendants inform consumers that once Defendants

receive their check, the gift pack will be sent to consumers
and the^major award will follow within 21 days.

Consumers who

send money to Defendants ultimately do so in reliance on
Defendants explicit and implicit representations that they will
be receiving quality merchandise and a valuable award.
Many consumers who receive merchandise and/or the major
award from Defendants are shocked and dismayed at the inferior
quality and comparatively worthless nature of the merchandise.’
The "major award" most frequently sent to consumers of by
Defendants is the "genuine" lead crystal.

No one has received

either of the cash awards,’ despite Defendants' pattern of
virtually assuring consumers that big cash award is theirs.
Sometimes, consumers who contact Defendants seeking a
refund are instead offered a "special discount" off the second
promotion.

One consumer who contacted Defendants for a refund

of his $499 was instead reloaded and convinced to send an
additional $1,150 for a second promotion with a lure of a
$10,000 grand prize.
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Defendants' representations that consumers will receive
desirable "major award" upon payment of sums ranging from $399
to $1,999 are made with the sole purpose of obtaining from
consumer large sums of money that greatly exceed the value of
the promised merchandise.
The individual named Defendant and Trade Winds Marketing,
Inc., as a corporation doing business in the State of Maine,
are subject to the provisions of the Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, which bars unfair trade and
deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce.

In addition, to the extent that Defendants solicit

the purchase of merchandise by means of direct contact
unsolicited by the consumer which does not take place at
Defendants' place of business, Defendants are subject to
regulation under the provisions of the Consumer Solicitation
Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. § 4661, et seq.
The Consumer Solicitation Sales Act requires that a written
contract be provided that contains, inter alia, the name and
address of the seller, the signature of the purchaser and the
seller, the terms of the contract, the notice of the
purchaser's right to cancel the contract by providing written
notice to the Defendant at its place of business within 3
business days of the date of the contract of the consumer's
intent not to be bound.

32 M.R.S.A. § 4662.

Any violation of

the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act is also an unfair trade
practice.

32 M.R.S.A. § 4668.

6
ARGUMENT
THE STATE OF MAINE HAS SATISFIED THAT STANDARDS
FOR OBTAINING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.
There are four criteria that ordinarily must be met in
order to obtain temporary or preliminary injunctive relief.
Those criteria are:
(1)

Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an

injunction is not granted;
(2)

Such irreparable harm outweighs any harm to Defendant;

(3)

Plaintiff has a likelihood of success on the merits;

and
(4)

The public interest is not adversely affected by the

granting of the relief.
Ingraham v. University of Maine at Orono, 441 A.2d 691, 693
(Me. 1980).

However, when the Attorney General seeks an order

to restrain continuing violations of.a State statute, he need
not establish that the State will suffer irreparable injury if
the injunction is not granted, or that the injury to the
Plaintiff outweighs any harm to the Defendant caused by
issuance of the injunction.

See State v . Sirois, 478 A.2d

1117, 1121-1122 (Me. 1984); U. V. Industries, Inc, v. Posner,
466 F .Supp. 1251, 1255-1256 (D.Me. 1979).

As the District

Court explained in U. V. Industries:
The rationale for such an exception with
respect to injunction suits which are
"creatures of statute" is that the party
bringing the suit is acting to vindicate the
public interest.... As the Supreme Court
stated in Hecht v . Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331
(1944), "Standards of the public interest,
not the requirements of private litigation,
measure the propriety in need for injunctive
relief in these cases."
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466 F.Supp. at 1256.

Accordingly, the State must establish

only that there is a likelihood of success on the merits and
that the public interest will not be adversely effected by the
granting of the requested relief.

The Verified Complaint and

Affidavits submitted in support of the State's Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order clearly satisfy both criteria.
A.

The State Has Established a Likelihood of Success on
the Merits.

Plaintiff has established a likelihood of success on the
merits on the basis of the statutory violations in which
Defendants continue to engage.

The Complaint and Affidavits

filed herewith, clearly establish that the conduct which
Defendants have engaged in and continue to engage in through
its ongoing solicitation of consumers nationwide is violative
of at least two separate statutory provisions:

The Maine

Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 and the Consumer
Solicitations Act, 32 M.R.S.A. § 4662.
Specifically, Defendants have violated and continue to
violate the Unfair Trade Practices Act by misrepresenting to
consumers, primarily senior citizens, that in return for
payment of money to Defendants, Defendants will provide
consumers with gift quality merchandise and a valuable major
award.

In its solicitation, Defendants intentionally create

the false impression that consumers will receive merchandise
and a major award that will exceed the value of the money paid
by the consumer to Defendants.

In truth, the merchandise and
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awards provided by Defendants are of poor quality, are obtained
by Defendants at a nominal cost, and have a retail value of
substantially less than the amount of money paid by the
consumer to Defendants.
On many occasions, Defendants repeatedly solicit the same
consumer in an attempt to have the consumer send even more
money to Defendants.

Defendants also engage in telephone

harassment by repeatedly telephoning those consumers who do not
initially agree to send money to Defendants for the purchase of
their merchandise and receipt of the major award.
Further, the Defendants have also violated and continue to
violate the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act by failing to
provide consumers with a contract which meets the requirements
of 32 M.R.S.A. § 4662.

In failing to provide consumers with a

contract which complies with Section 4662, Defendants also fail
to provide consumers with timely notice of their right to avoid
the contract within three business days.
There is no indication on the record that any of the facts
alleged by the State in its Complaint and supporting Affidavits
either will be or can be controverted by Defendants.

As noted

above, these facts clearly establish statutory violations.
Accordingly, the State has demonstrated a likelihood of success
on the merits
B.

The Public Interest Will Not be Adversely Affected by
the Granting of the Requested Relief.

It is clear that the public interest will not be adversely
affected by an order which restrains violations of State
statute designed to protect the general public.
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C.

While a Showing of Irreparable Harm is Not a
Prerequisite to Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order Here, It is Clear that Consumer Will Suffer
Irreparable Injury if Defendants' Conduct Continues
Unrestrained, and That Such Injury Outweighs Any Harm
to Defendants.

If Defendants' violation of law, as set forth in the
Complaint, continue unrestrained, an increasing number of
consumers nationwide will suffer immediate and irreparable
injury in that they will be led to pay Defendants funds which
are being obtained by Defendants as a result of unfair and
deceptive practices in violation of Maine law.

Once consumers

have paid money to Defendants, it is highly unlikely that they
will ever be able to obtain restitution from an enterprise
which is essentially a boiler room operation run by individuals
who make intentional misrepresentations to the elderly in order
to induce them to send money to Defendants.

Further, as set

forth in the Complaint and Affidavit of Colleen Quint, Esq.,
Defendant Glidden was previously in the employ and Vice
President of a telemarketing company sued by the State in
August of 1992 for engaging in practices virtually identical to
those presently engaged in by Defendants.
Conversely, if Defendants should be vindicated at a hearing
on Plaintiff's request for a Preliminary Injunction, it will
have suffered minimal harm from the resulting delay in
receiving such funds as the Court may determine it is entitled
to receive.
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CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff has satisfied the applicable criteria for the
issuance of injunctive relief.

Accordingly, pending a

Preliminary Injunction hearing, this Court should order
Defendant temporarily restrained from continuing to engage in
practices that are unfair and deceptive in violation of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Solicitation Sales
Act.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated:
STEPHEN L. WESSLER
Deputy Attorney General

AMY M. HOMANS
Assistant Attorney General

COLI
Assistant
Attorney Generali
\
Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station #6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC
ET A L .,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR APPROVAL
OF EX PARTE ATTACHMENT

Plaintiff moves this Court to order ex parte that
attachment may be made against the properties of Defendants
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 4A in the amount of $500,000 on the
grounds that (1) there is a reasonable likelihood that in this
action Plaintiff will recover judgment, including civil
penalties, costs and interest, in an amount equal to or greater
than the amount of the attachment over and above the aggregate
of insurance, bonds, or other security available and (2) there
is a clear danger that Defendants, Trade Winds Marketing, Inc.,
and Donald Glidden will remove the property from the State or
conceal it or otherwise make it unavailable to satisfy a
judgment if notified in advance of the attachment.

In support

of its Motion, Plaintiff relies upon and incorporates fully
herein the Affidavit and Certificate of Colleen J. Quint,
Assistant Attorney General, which are being

.

\

- 2 filed together with this Motion.

Plaintiff further relies upon

the Complaint and the Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff's request for Preliminary Injunction.

Dated:

April 2, 1993

MICHAEL E. CARPENTER
Attorney General
STEPHEN L. WESSLER
Deputy Attorney General

¿CpliLEEN J. QUINT
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, ME 04333
(207) 626-8800

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISSOLVE EX PARTE
ORDER APPROVING
ATTACHMENT

NOW COME the Defendants pursuant to Rules 4A and 4B
M.R.Civ.P and move^to dissolve an ex parte order approving
attachment dated April 2, 1993.

In support of this Motion

Defendants contend that the motion was improperly granted,
that the Plaintiff failed to meet the requisite statutory
and civil rule burden for justifying attachment, and that
Plaintiff has failed to show by specific factual affidavit
that it is more likely than not that Plaintiff will recover
judgment against Defendants in any amount, much less in the
amount of five hundred thousand dollars.

Defendants further

contend that Plaintiff provided the Court no basis upon
which to issue any order for attachment ex parte, that
Plaintiff showed no factual basis for its contention that
Defendants would conceal, remove or destroy assets.
In support of the within motion, Defendants rely upon
the affidavit and exhibits filed herewith and the memorandum
of law filed herewith and incorporated herein.

Wherefore, Defendants pray that the attachment order be
dissolved and for such further relief as may be warranted.

Dated: April 9, 1993

Respectfully submitted,

Coleman G. Coyne, Jr.
Attorney for Defendar Ks
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

(
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.
et al.,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS'. MEMORANDUM OF
LAW INSUPPORT OF MOTION
TODISSOLVE
EX PARTE
ATTACHMENT

The granting of an attachment under the current rule
requires specific allegations of fact contained in affidavit
form and proving that the applicant, more likely than not,
will prevail.

Furthermore, the applicant has the burden of

showing by affidavit that he will prevail in an amount equal
to the amount of the attachment sought.
The Law Court has repeatedly noted,
We have required strict compliance with the rule
requiring specific facts sufficient to warrant the
necessary findings. Atlantic Heating Co., Inc, v.
Lavin, 572 A.2d 479 (Me. 1990).
In the above case the Plaintiff's sought Attachment for
alleged "fraudulent acts."

They presented a single

affidavit devoid of any specific facts.

Instead, they

improperly included in their affidavit nothing but the
general allegations of their complaint.

The Law Court held

such conclusory affidavits lacking specific allegations of
fact to be patently insufficient.

The Court also noted

that, "the absence of factual specificity required to fix

C

the amount of attachment, requested for one hundred fifty

<

-2thousand dollars, is equally unsatisfactory."
479. (Emphasis added).

572 A.2d at

Citing Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d

1325, 1329 (Me. 1981).
In the present case, the applicant for ex parte
attachment has submitted a similarly deficient affidavit
which contains no specific facts proving either the alleged
fraudulent acts or any resulting damage.

As such, the

single affidavit presented to the Court in support of an ex
parte attachment was clearly insufficient to support either
prong of the applicant's burden.
-'' Effective February 15, 1992, the standard for
entitlement to attachment has been made more difficult for
Plaintiffs to meet.
n.3 (Me. 1991).

See Jaques v. Brown, 609 A.2d 290, 292,

"Before an attachment can be approved, the

Court must find that the moving party will succeed on his or
her claim by a preponderance of the evidence."

Id.

Under

the new rule, an applicant for attachment still has the
two-pronged burden of showing not only the probability of
success but also the probability of obtaining judgment in an
amount at least equaling the amount of the requested
attachment.

Id.

Bowman v. Dussault, supra.

In the present case the Plaintiff seeks an Attachment
in the amount of five hundred thousand dollars.

However,

Plaintiff has provided the Court with no evidence supporting
that request.

Though Plaintiff claims to represent unnamed

individuals allegedly defrauded, Plaintiff has not even
provided the Court with a single affidavit from such a

-3person, nor has Plaintiff provided the Court with a single
document showing damage in any amount to any individual.

In

spite of this, Plaintiff has asked the Court to give it the
extraordinary advantage in this litigation of attaching
assets to the extent of a half million dollars.

For all

that was presented to the Court, Plaintiff could just as
easily have asked for one dollar or one million dollars and
the Court would have no basis upon which to decide in favor
of Plaintiff's request.
In Bowman v. Dussault, supra, the Law Court noted the
serious hardship that results to one litigant from the
granting of an attachment.

Because of this, the Court said,

there must be strict adherence to the burdensome
prerequisite laid down as a condition precedent to
attachment.

See also Plumbago Min, Corp. v. Sweatt, 444

A.2d 361, cert, den. 459 U.S. 831, 103 S.Ct. 71, 74 L.Ed. 2d
70 (Me. 1982) .
Under Maine law it has long been held that allegations
of counsel and oral arguments of counsel are not a
sufficient substitute for sworn statements of specific
facts.

Englebrecht v. Development Corp. for Evergreen

Valley, 361 A.2d 908, 911, n.2 (Me. 1976) .

Conclusory

statements are insufficient to meet the requirement of
specific factual allegations in sworn affidavit form.
Anderson v. Kennebec River Pulp & Paper Co., 433 A.2d 752
(Me. 1981).

Connor v, Stitham, 485 A.2d 659 (Me. 1984).

Applying these principals to the single affidavit submitted

-4first six paragraphs relate strictly to the history of the
case being filed and Plaintiff's legal position that an
attachment should be granted.

There are no specific facts

stated therein.
Paragraph 7 states that Defendant, Glidden, "has a
history of association with fraudulent telemarketing
practices in the State of Maine."

Clearly this is a

conclusory statement containing what is at best an
unsupported opinion of counsel.
specific facts.

It provides the Court no

The fact that Defendant, Glidden "was

previously employed by Capital Advertising Inc., a
telemarketing business located in Auburn and Scarborough,
Maine," is a factual allegation but it adds nothing to
support an attachment.

The same is true for the allegation

that Mr. Glidden was Vice President of Capital Advertising
and that he worked as its bookkeeper.

The allegation that

Capital Advertising "became a focus of an investigation"
adds no support for an attachment against Mr. Glidden or
Trade Winds Marketing.

The Court is next told that Capital

Advertising "closed its doors" when the State of Maine in
some other case "was granted a preliminary injunction
against its fraudulent

business practices."

This latter

statement not only has nothing to do with any current
allegations against the present Defendants but, more
importantly, it does not even purport to provide the Court
with any specific facts which would show fraudulent
practices on the part of some other entity to wit:

Capital

-5Advertising, which is not even a party to these proceedings
and which is not in privy with any party to these
proceedings.
The next paragraph of the Affidavit, Paragraph 8, again
contains only a conclusory statement claiming that "the
Defendant" operates in a "virtually identical" manner to
Capital Advertising.

Both Defendants, of course, deny this

allegation but this is beside the point.

This personal

opinion or conclusion is couched in the most obscure and
indefinite terms.

It could not possibly be interpreted to

meet the requirement of the rule requiring specific factual
allegations.

The same is true for the one remaining

allegation of Paragraph 8 which again states in totally
conclusory fashion, "the individual Defendant formally
employed at Capital Advertising has merely transported these
unlawful practices from one company to another."
Thus far, the examination of the affidavit in question
has not yielded a single "specific fact" supporting an
attachment in the amount of five hundred thousand dollars or
in any amount.

No further support will be found in the

remaining two paragraphs of the affidavit.

Paragraph 9

contains the colorful but meaningless allegation that
"Defendant's business is essentially a boiler room which can
be dismantled and moved to an alternative location virtually
overnight."

Once again, this says nothing to justify an

attachment.
In Paragraph 10 of the Affidavit the State provides no

further facts but merely sums up.

In this paragraph the

Court is asked to grant an attachment apparently for two
reasons:

(a) "in light of the nature of Defendant's

business" and (b) "his prior association with a company
engaged in telemarketing fraud."
This literally constitutes the entire factual basis
upon which an attachment has been sought and, on an ex parte
basis, granted.
While Defendant vigorously denies the State's
unsupported conclusory allegations, if it were for the sake
of argument to be assumed that these allegations were true,
there would still be not a single shred of evidence to
justify an attachment in any amount.
defrauded?

Who has been

How much money have they lost?

were they defrauded?
their money back?

By what means

Did these unnamed individuals ask for

If so, did Defendants refuse?

Defendants

have, and the Attorney General's Office knew this before
filing suit, a 100% money-back guarantee policy.

This ij3 an

allegation of fact and it is supported by the accompanying
Affidavit of Donald Glidden.

Long before the filing of this

law suit and this Motion for ex parte attachment, Defendants
repeatedly asked the Attorney General's Office to disclose
the name of any individual customer of Defendants' who
claims to have sought and been refused such a refund.
(Examples of such requests are contained in the letters
dated October 21, 1992 and February 2, 1993 from Trade
Winds' counsel to the Attorney General's Office, which

Winds' counsel to the Attorney General's Office, which
letters are attached hereto and incorporated herein.)

No

such individual has ever been identified.
Such a disclosure should have been part of Plaintiff's
affidavit in support of attachment if in fact anyone has
been damaged and if in fact there is a probability of
success on Plaintiff's complaint.

The absence of such

factual allegations, and indeed any specific factual
allegations, emphasizes all the more clearly the error in
granting Plaintiff a five hundred thousand dollar
attachment, ex parte or otherwise.
When the new provisions of Rule 4A and 4B M.R.Civ.P.
were adopted, the change was a response to "prevailing
concerns that attachments are too freely given under the
existing standard."
of M.R.Civ.P. 4A.

Advisory Committee's Note to Amendment
The purpose of the more difficult burden

was further "to strike a more even balance between Plaintiff
and Defendant in the use of attachment."

Id.

The change

reflected a deliberate policy decision.
In the present case, the State has been able to
circumvent this policy, thereby gaining a tremendous
advantage in that Defendants are trying to operate a
business and their checking accounts have been frozen.

This

causes numerous practical difficulties and constitutes a
serious handicap for Defendants both in conducting business
and in this litigation.

The purpose of the attachment is

not to give Plaintiff this advantage nor to disadvantage

security is necessary and the cause of action is proven
meritorious.

As the attached correspondence shows, these

Defendants have been communicating and cooperating with the
Attorney General's Office since as long ago as last October.
Defendant Glidden is a lifelong resident of the State of
Maine and an ex parte attachment tying up the account of him
and his wife and his business was totally unnecessary and
uncalled for.

The State has seemingly made an effort to

give the Court the impression that Mr. Glidden is likely to
flee the state but that false impression is inconsistent
with his actions in this entire matter beginning almost five"
months ago.
For all of the forgoing reasons, Defendants
respectfully request that the Court dissolve the existing
attachment.

Respectfully submitted

Dated:

April 9, 1993

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-93-156

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.,
and DONALD GLIDDEN
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

OBJECTIONTO MOTION
TO DISSOLVE EX PARTE
ATTACHMENT

INTRODUCTION
The State files this memorandum in opposition to the Motion
to Dissolve Ex Parte Attachment filed by defendants Trade Winds
Marketing, Inc. ("Trade Winds") and Donald Glidden ("Glidden") in
the above-captioned matter pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 4A(h) .
FACTS
On April 9, 1993 the State filed a complaint against Trade
Winds Marketing, Inc., a telemarketing business, and Donald
Glidden, president of the company. The complaint asserted
violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (5 M.R.S.A. §206 et

seq .)
et

and the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act (32 M.R.S.A. §4661

seq .) .
Along with the Complaint, the State also filed a Motion for

Preliminary Injunction and a Motion for Ex Parte Attachment.

The

Court, Delahanty, C.J., granted the Motion for Ex Parte Attachment

that same day.

The Motion for Preliminary Injunction has gone

onto the docket and will be heard at some future date.

As to the

Motion for Attachment, the court specifically found that it was
more likely than not that the State would prevail in its suit
against Defendant Trade Winds and Defendant Glidden and recover
judgment against them in the amount sought.
The writs of attachment were then served on area banks, and
returns of service were made.

Defendants seek to dissolve the

attachments which were made on certain bank accounts held in their
names, individually and jointly, at Lisbon Community Federal
Credit Union.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
Defendants' Motion to Dissolve the Ex Parte Attachment rests
on two principal arguments.

The first asserts that it is not more

likely than not that the State will ultimately prevail in its suit
against Defendants because the State has made only generalized
allegations concerning Defendant Trade Winds Marketing's business
and Defendant Glidden's involvement in that business.

The second

argument presented by Defendants in support of their Motion to
Dissolve the Ex Parte Attachment is that the State's Motion for Ex
Parte Attachment and the accompanying affidavit do not establish
that the state will prevail in the amount sought and approved in
the attachment order.
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None of these arguments establishes a foundation for
dissolving the attachment order now in effect.

1. Allegations in the State's complaint and pleadings are
sufficient to uphold the ex parte attachment order against
Defendant Trade Winds Marketing and Defendant Glidden.
It continues to be more likely than not that the State will
establish that Defendant Trade Winds Marketing and Defendant
Glidden have violated both the Unfair Trade Practices Act and the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
Defendant Glidden is the president of Defendant Trade Winds
Marketing, a telemarketing company.

Defendants engage in a

pattern of misrepresentation to the elderly consumers whom they
solicit and who send the company hundreds, sometimes thousands, of
dollars for items of substantially less value.

Consumers'

incentive for doing business with Trade Winds in the first
instance stems from the company's false representations concerning
the consumers' likelihood of winning a substantial cash prize.
These misrepresentations are outlined more fully in the complaint
and are summarized in the Supplemental Affidavit which accompanies
this memorandum.

These two documents also describe more fully the

Defendants' failure to accord consumers their statutorilyguaranteed three-day right to cancel a transaction.
Mr. Glidden was formerly Vice President of Capital
Advertising, a telemarketing company which operated in Maine until
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last August, when the State filed a lawsuit against Capital
Advertising.

Capital Advertising was run in substantially the

same manner as is Trade Winds Marketing.

Defendant Trade Winds

employs several individuals who formerly worked as telemarketers
at Capital Advertising.

The Attorney General's Office has

received numerous unsolicited letters from consumers who did
business with Capital Advertising and were either dissatisfied
with what they received or, more often, had received nothing for
the money sent in.
The State is aware that Defendant Trade Winds Marketing is a
different company than Capital Advertising.
being examined on its own merits.

Each business is

The State is aware that

Defendant Trade Winds is making an effort to comply with statutory
requirements regarding a consumer's right to cancel.

It is the

State's position, however, that these efforts nevertheless fall
short of what is required.

The State is also aware that

Defendants do actually ship merchandise and awards to consumers,
which was not always the case with Capital Advertising.

Again,

however, these efforts fall short since the items sent to the
consumers are neither of the nature or quality as was represented
in the telemarketing sales pitch.

Defendants engaged in a pattern

of fraud and misrepresentation in the course of their
telemarketing business and it is for this reason, not any
confusion on the State's part as to whether this is the same
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company as Capital Advertising, that the State has sued Defendant
Trade Winds and Defendant Glidden.
Defendants make much of the fact that the State has not
provided to them the names of consumers who complained or were
dissatisfied with their dealings with Trade Winds Marketing.
Defendants do purport to have a 100% money-back guaranty policy.
However, the State contends that it is the practice of the company
to respond to consumer requests for refunds by putting the
company's best salesmen on the phone to offer disgruntled
consumers additional merchandise "at no extra cost" or even to
claim a willingness to. "discount" off the higher cost of the
second-round promotion.

The State is concerned about putting

elderly consumers in further contact with the company which has
already subjected them to misprepresentations.
it is the

pattern

In addition, since

of misrepresentation with which the State is

concerned, Defendants cannot address this through a piecemeal
approach.

Responding to a list of individual consumers does not

remedy the pervasive company-wide problem of misrepresentation.

A.

The U nfair Trade P r a c t i c e s Act

The Unfair Trade Practices Act makes it unlawful to engage in
unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
5 M.R.S.A. §207.

See

Defendant Glidden clearly meets the definitional

requirements of the Act:

he is a "person" who is engaged in
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"trade or commerce".

See 5 M.R.S.A. §206(2) and (3).

The

definition of "person" includes a natural persons as well as
corporations.

See Id.

Engaging in trade or commerce includes

conduct which can be described as "offering for sale, sale or
distribution of... any property. .. and any other article. .. or
thing of value".

Defendant Glidden can hardly dispute that as

President of Trade Winds Marketing he offered for sale, sold and
distributed the Gift Ensemble and other items.
The conduct engaged in by Defendants constitutes an
unequivocal violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.

^

Telemarketers employed by Defendants unfairly and deceptively told
consumers they were "absolutely guaranteed" a "major award" which
could include $5,000.

These telemarketers routinely make

statements to consumers intended to create the false impression
the consumer has, in fact, won the $5,000 award.

They insist the

consumer has to be an "active customer" and purchase for $699
products which were worth a fraction of that amount.i

^Customers who balked at this amount were bargained down to a
usual lowest price of $399. Furthermore, documents provided to the
State by Defendants show that when a consumer sends $499 to
Defendants, consumers receive a package of items whose r e t a i l
value, according to Defendants, is only half that amount. The
remaining fifty percent of consumers' money goes to the $99
"membership fee" and a $150 "handling fee." The membership fee
covers the cost of "free" gifts; the handling fee "offsets the
cost of shipping, overnight services, packaging, paperwork
processing and the major award."
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Defendant Glidden is not a mere employee at Trade Winds, he
is the president and founder of the company.

He has been named as

a defendant in this case because his business has consistently
engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation to consumers whom his
employees solicited during his tenure at Trade Winds.

The State

will prove these allegations at trial through the testimony of
victims solicited by Defendants' and their employees, testimony of
former employees, and through documentary evidence.
The Ex Parte Order of Attachment should not be dissolved as
it remains more likely than not that the State-will ultimately
prevail against these Defendants for violations of the Unfair
Trade Practices Act and recover judgment against them.

B . The Consumer S o l i c i t a t i o n S a l e s Act
The Consumer Solicitation Sales Act requires that when any
sale is agreed to and the consumer did not initiate the contact,
the consumer must be informed of his three day right to cancel.2

232 M.R.S.A. § 4662 provides in full as follows:
Where merchandise is sold or contracted
to be sold, whether under a single contract or
under multiple contracts, to a consumer as a
result of or in connection with a salesman's
direct contact accomplished by means of and
including, but not limited to, a personal
visit or a telephone call upon the consumer,
other than at the seller's place of business,
without the consumer soliciting the initial
contact, the contract shall be in writing,

7

See 32 M.R.S.A. §4662.
following practices:

The Act specifically prohibits the
misrepresentation, creating false

impressions, and making false promises.3 See Id. at §4671.
violation of this Act is considered to be a violation of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act.

See Id. at §4670.

The definition of "person" provided by the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act includes individuals, employees, and

bear the signature o£-the seller and the
consumer, contain the date of the transaction
, the terms of the sale or offer, the name and
the mailing address of the seller's permanenet
place of business, a statement of the
consumer's right to avoid as provided in this
subchapter and a statement of the limitation
contained in section 4664-A. A completely
executed copy of the contract or agreement
shall be furnished by the seller to the
consumer immediately after the consumer signs
the agreement of contract.
3§ 4671.

Prohibited practices

A seller may not:
1. Misrepresentations. Misrepresent any
material fact relating to the terms or
conditions of sale;
2. False impressions. Create an impression
that is false or the seller does hot believe
to be true; and
3. False promises. Promise performance that
the seller does not intend to perform or knows
will not be performed.

8

Any

salesmen, as well as corporations.3
4 See Id. at §4661(3).
Defendants and their employees were selling "merchandise" since
the Gift Ensemble and other such items were objects, wares and
goods.

See Id. at §4661(2).

Clearly Defendants were making

"sales", since they were selling, offering to sell and attempting
to sell the goods.

See Id. at §4661(4) .

Defendants' violations of this act were myriad.

Defendants

did not inform consumers of their three-day right to cancel in a
timely manner.

They misrepresented material facts related to the

terms and conditions of the sale.
they did not believe were true.

They created false impressions
They made false promises they did

not intend to perform or knew would not be performed.

Defendants'

conduct, outlined more fully above and in the complaint, as well
as in the Supplemental Affidavit, constituted repeated violations
of the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.

C.

O p e r a t i n g an U n li c e n s e d Game o f Chance

The State also is more likely than not to prevail on the
third of the counts of its complaint against Defendants.

4 32 M.R.S.A. § 4661(3) provides as follows:
3. Person. "Person" includes any individual,
firm, partnership, association, society, club,
corportation, estate, trust and any agent,
employee, salesman, partner, officer,
director, member stockholder or trustee
thereof.

9

Maine

law prohibits all unlicensed games of chance.

17 M.R.S.A. § 331.

Gaines of chance are defined as "a game, contest, scheme or device
in which a person stakes or risks something of value for an
opportunity to win something of value and in which the outcome
depends in a material degree upon an element of chance...".

Id.

§330(2) . Consumers stake or risk something of value (the money
they send in for the merchandise in the Gift Ensemble) to receive
something of value (the "prize", which they are guaranteed but can
only receive if they purchase the Gift Ensemble) , and the outcome
of this, transaction is determined by chance (the consumer, in
theory, could win any of the five "major" awards) .
Furthermore, licenses can be granted only to eligible
organizations, and Defendants do not meet the statutory
requirements for eligibility since they are not a charitable
organization or school.

Id. § 332(1).

2. The State has established that it will ultimately prevail in
the amount sought in the attachment.
The State concedes that the Motion for Ex Parte Attachment
and accompanying affidavit, as originally filed, did not contain

sp ecific

information to support the amount of $500,000 requested

in the attachment.

The court, Delahanty, C.J., has granted the

attachment in this amount, finding that it is more likely than not
that the State will prevail against Defendants in the amount of

10

$500,000.
The State now offers to the court through the Supplemental
Affidavit accompanying this memorandum further and more specific
support for the amount sought and granted in the attachment order.
That affidavit provides information concerning the volume of
Defendants' business which gives rise to a conclusion that
attachment in the amount of $500,000 is proper.

This conclusion

is based on information from independent sources that Defendants
have done business with nearly 500 consumers through one courier
alone and that the volume of Defendants' business, at least of
late, is in the realm of $5,000 to $7,000 per day.
In the alternative, if this court finds that the amount
sought in the attachment is excessive, the State would ask the
Court to modify its prior ruling and grant an oral motion to amend
the original order to lessen the amount of the attachment.
A difference of opinion over the appropriateness of the
amount of attachment sought, however, does not necessitate
dissolution of the attachment.

Indeed, the State vigorously

contends that attachment in a substantial amount is appropriate
and that it remains more likely than not that the State will
prevail in such an amount.

11

CONCLUSION
As established before the initial Ex Parte Order of
Attachment was granted, and as is more fully outlined above in
response to the Motion to Dissolve that attachment and the
accompanying Supplemental Affidavit, it is more likely than not
that the state will prevail against these Defendants.
granting of original motion should stand.

The

The Motion to Dissolve

the Ex Parte Attachment brought by Defendant Trade Winds and
Defendant Glidden should be denied.

Dated at Augusta, Maine this 12th day of April, 1993.

COLLEEN J. QUINT
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV—93—156

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
PLAINTIFF
V.

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.,
a Maine corporation,
AND
DONALD GLIDDEN,
DEFENDANTS

)
)
)
) PLAINTIFF7S MOTION FOR
)CONTINUANCE
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff moves this Court to continue the hearing
requested by Defendants in their Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte
Attachment.

That Motion is currently scheduled to be heard on

Tuesday, April 13, 1993 at 9:00 a.m.
The State requests that the Court postpone the hearing on
this Motion until Wednesday, April 14, 1993 at 9:00 a.m.

On

Friday, April 9, 1993 the State received a copy of Defendants7
Request for Hearing.

However, there was no accompanying

Memorandum of Law or Proposed Order with that Request for
Hearing.

The Request for Hearing did not state the nature of

the hearing sought or otherwise identify the hearing as for a
Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte Attachment.

Undersigned counsel

was not in the office Friday and did not become aware of the
Request for Hearing until Monday morning.

It was also not

until Monday morning that the Defendants, upon Plaintiff's
request, faxed to Plaintiff a copy of the Memorandum of Law in
Support of the Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte Attachment.

Since

the State did not receive the relevant information until a very
late date, we simply request an extension of 24 hours to
adequately prepare for the hearing.

The State also notes that Maine Rule of Civil Procedure
4A(h) states that "On two days notice to the Plaintiff" the
Motion to Dissolve or modify an attachment may be filed.

Since

the State did not in fact receive notice of the Motion until
Monday, April 12, then delaying the hearing until Wednesday,
April 14 would seem to best accommodate the Rules.

The State

is aware of the fact that the Rules do provide for a shorter
notice to the Plaintiff if the court so prescribes.

However,

the interest of justice will hardly be served if the State does
not have an opportunity to adequately prepare for the hearing
sought by Defendants.

Dated:

Aprii 12, 1993

_____________________________
COLLEEN J. QUINT
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800

The Motion for Continuance is approved/denied.

JUSTICE
Superior Court

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.
et al.,
Defendants

)
)
ORDER
)
) i
)
)
)
)
)

The Defendants Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte Order
Approving Attachment is hereby granted/act granted.-

Justice, Superior Court

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
VS
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.
et al.,
Defendants

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
__________________

INTRODUCTION

This is an action unfairly commenced by the Attorney
General's Office against a corporation legitimately doing
business and one of its employees. Neither Defendant has
engaged in any unfair trade practice nor has either violated
the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, which in fact does not
even apply, because only consumers who solicited calls were
contacted and none of these were located within the State of
Maine.
The corporate Defendant operates a legitimate
telemarketing business and employs Defendant, Donald
Glidden. The company sells quality merchandise to customers
who agree to pay for it. If the customers are unsatisfied
with the merchandise after receiving it, they can receive a
100% money-back guarantee upon return of the merchandise.
Customers are of all ages. Most are very happy with the
quality and price of the merchandise they receive.
No false representations are made. Trade Winds, in fact,
employs a procedure designed to assure that no customer is
operating under any misunderstanding, however unintentional.
For this purpose Trade Winds employs an individual who calls
customers upon receipt of their check to make sure the
individual understands exactly what he or she is getting.

In the event the customer indicates any misunderstanding
whatsoever, the individual's check is returned. The
allegation by the Attorney General's Office that the
merchandise is of "marginal quality" apparently represents a
difference of opinion but certainly does not rise to the
level of a misrepresentation of fact. Customers who have
dealt with Trade Winds and enjoy its products agree that the
quality is to their liking. If they did not, they would
take advantage of Trade Winds' money back guarantee.
In connection with this law suit and prior to its
filing by the Attorney General's Office, the Defendants and
their attorneys have repeatedly asked the Attorney General's
Office to disclose the name of any individual who is
dissatisfied with merchandise received or who requested and
failed to receive a refund. The Attorney General's Office
was unable and unwilling to identify a single person and to
this day, refuses to do so.
Defendant, Trade Winds Marketing, Inc., is a duly
authorized lawful corporation incorporated under the laws of
the State of Maine, and its business is located in the City
of Auburn, Androscoggin County, Maine. Defendant, Donald
Glidden, is a life-long resident of the State of Maine and
serves as President of Trade Winds Marketing, Inc.

He

currently resides with his family in Lisbon Falls,
Androscoggin County, Maine.
Defendants deny they have violated either the Unfair
Trade Practices Act or the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
Even though they have not violated those acts, Defendants
state that those acts do not apply to Defendants' actions in
any event.
The Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act is contained in 5
MRSA §205-A et seq. Neither Defendant has done anything to
violate this act. The Attorney General's Office has refused
to disclose to Defendants the name of any individual who
claims to have been deprived of any money by any unfair or
deceptive act.or practice on the part of either Defendant.

The Consumer Solicitation Sales Act is contained in 32
MRSA §4661 et seq. Pursuant to §4662, the act applies only
in such cases where a consumer is called upon by a salesman
(sic) "without the consumer soliciting the initial contact."
In this action it has not been alleged that any individual
contacted did not solicit the contact. In fact, Trade Winds
Marketing contacts only potential consumers who have asked
to be contacted. Although the Consumer Solicitation Sales
Act does not apply because of this, and although Trade Winds
believes it has complied with any applicable provisions of
the Act, Defendants are unaware and deny any violations,
intentional or otherwise, of this statutory provision.
Defendants provide written contracts to all customers by
mail pursuant to an agreement with the United States Postal
Service whereby the mail is supposedly guaranteed to be
delivered within 48 hours. The Consumer Solicitation Sales
Act requires that the customer be given notice of his or her
right to cancel a transaction within three (3) full business
days. In an effort to avoid any inconvenience, Trade Winds'
contract contains a notice conspicuously advising the
customer that he or she has five business days to change his
or her mind.
(Trade Winds will even allow cancellation
thereafter in the event a consumer has delayed and Trade
Winds has a 100% money-back guarantee in any event.) The
Attorney General's Office was furnished a copy of this
document before the filing of this litigation and was
furnished a copy of Trade Winds' customer satisfaction
guarantee. Copies of Trade Winds' membership contract and a
copy of its Customer Satisfaction Guarantee are attached
hereto and incorporated herein. When completed with
reference to a particular transaction, we believe the
membership contract contains all provisions required by the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act. The written guarantee is
in large, bold-faced type and it contains no fine print.
It should be emphasized that despite Plaintiff's

repeated allegations of "shoddy merchandise" and "junk
merchandise," no breach of warranty claim is being brought
by the State of Maine nor by any individual consumer. If,
as alleged, "many consumers are shocked and dismayed" at the
"inferior quality" of merchandise they received, it should
be expected that such allegedly inferior merchandise would
violate both express and implied warranties. The absence of
such a claim and the absence of a single consumer joining in
the allegation greatly undermines the claim.
II.

ARGUMENT
At the outset, Defendants note that despite claims by
the State to the contrary, the complaint is not a Verified
Complaint and no affidavits were submitted in support of the
motion for preliminary injunction. Affidavits, later held
to be insufficient, were submitted by the State in support
of a request for attachment. Those affidavits, however,
were confined to the legal theories and expectations of one
of the State's attorneys. The affidavits were not based
upon personal knowledge and were later deemed to be
insufficient, even to support the granting of an attach
ment. Because the State's complaint is unverified and the
motion seeking an injunction is unaccompanied by any
affidavits, Defendants are not submitting any affidavits in
response. When and if the State does submit proper
affidavits. Defendants will vigorously contest those allega
tions of fact where the State has erred.
Throughout this response, Defendants may be referred to
in the plural, but Defendants wish to emphasize that
Defendant Glidden should not be a party defendant. He is an
employee of the Trade Winds corporation. He does not
personally engage in any telephone solicitations or
communications with customers. To the extent that Plaintiff
means to allege otherwise, Plaintiffs are incorrect and
Defendants expressly deny such allegations.

As an

individual employee of the corporation, Defendant Glidden is

not personally liable for the acts of other employees of the
corporation even if those acts are imputable to the
corporation itself. Nor is Defendant Glidden personally
liable because he may have an ownership interest in the
corporation.
Plaintiff's case is based entirely on two recurring
theories: (1) that QUALITY is misrepresented and (2) that
VALUE is misrepresented. (Memo, p.7). Quality and Value are
generally relative, and often subjectively-measured. They
are not generally considered as a matter of fact, but more
properly, a matter of opinion.
Specifically, Plaintiff is alleging the creation of a
"false impression" that someone "will receive merchandise
and a major award THAT WILL EXCEED the value of the money
paid by the consumer to Defendants." (Memo, p. 7). The
first part of this quote, i.e ., that people will receive
merchandise and a "major award", is true. The State implies
but is not claiming customers don't receive these items.
The rest of the allegations is rather vague. Plaintiff
doesn't allege Defendants make specific statements that "the
value will exceed the money paid." That would be a
statement of fact. Instead, Plaintiff's case is based on
the theory that Defendants "create the false impression" of
value exceeding purchase price. Defendants deny
misrepresenting value. But beyond this, Defendants don't
believe it is proper to base a claim of misrepresentation of
fact when the fact allegedly misrepresented is the highly
subjective and amorphous concept of "value."
Plaintiff further makes the allegation that:
(1) Quality is "poor"
(2) Defendants pay only a "nominal cost"
(3) "Retail value" is "substantially less"
than what customers pay. (Memo, p.7-8).
All of these allegations involve areas typically left
to the marketplace to determine in a free economy. Not
everyone buys a Mercedes.

Quality is often in the eyes (and

pocketbook) of the beholder. We have both express and
implied warranties in our legal system to address quality
deficiencies that rise to the level of being legally
cognizable. It is very important to note that no such
claims for breach of warranty are being made in this case.
Instead, the State has decided to proceed on the more vague
and uncertain path of questioning "quality" and "value" in
general, and what Defendants may have paid wholesale for the
products they then resold.
What Defendants pay for what they sell is not a matter
for the State to be concerned with. The price of
merchandise sold on the open market is not regulated. How
is the State of Maine authorized to interject itself into
what is an appropriate markup for a seller or how much a
buyer should be allowed to spend? How, by whom, and in what
market is the "retail value" of an item to be determined?
The law does not allow the State to be suing businesses
because the supposed "retail value", by someone's standard,
is less than what the market is willing to pay.
Such matters are not the province of the State to
control, at least not in our present economy and under
existing laws. It would be a dangerous and unwarranted
precedent indeed to allow the State to begin to do so under
the guise of controlling "unfair or deceptive" practices.
At present, we know not what specific statement the
State relies upon to support its theory of misrepresenta
tions creating a "false impression" of quality and value.
No specifics have been provided. However, it is expected
that any such claims of value and quality would be analogous
to the statements which the law Court found "too vague" to
constitute warranties in Guiggey v Bombardier, 615 A.2d
1169 (Me. 1992) There, the Court held that words
suggesting a snowmobile "runs nice" and "will go good" could
not form the basis of a warranty claim or misrepresentation.
There is no perceptible difference between these
"representations" and statements saying something is of

"quality" or that it is "a good buy." Clearly, the
statements in both cases are extremely vague and incapable
of objective verification as fact. Furthermore, Defendants
deny making any misrepresentations of value in the first
place.
The vagueness of the alleged misrepresentations is not
enhanced or made more actionable merely by being shrouded in
the imprecise metaphor of saying they constitute "unfair" or
"deceptive practices." The law Court has noted its
reluctance "to broadly interpret the definition of conduct
which constitutes per se violations of the UTPA." State Ex
Rel Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866, 874 (Me. 1981).
In Tierney, the Law Court further quoted with approval the
words of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals regarding just
what does and does not qualify as "unfair or deceptive":
" [T]he objectionable conduct must attain a
level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow
of someone inured to the rough and tumble world
of commerce." 436 A.2d at 874, n.14, quoting
Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, 379 Mass. App. 914,
396 N. E. 2d 149 (1979).
The issue in the present case should not be whether
telemarketing is an industry which irritates those who don't
like being bothered by the telephone ringing. Yet the State
is literally complaining, to the court that "Defendants
engage in telephone harassment..." (Memorandum of Law, p. 8)
and "repeatedly solicit the same consumer in an attempt to
have the consumer send even more money to Defendants." Id.
Another way of saying this is that Defendants try to do
business again with those who have purchased products
previously. These are people who retained the products,
paid for them, liked them, and found no reason to claim any
breach of warranty and who have not asked Defendants to
refrain from using the telephone to contact them again. Why
is this objectionable? Identifying satisfied customers who
are likely to buy one's products again is generally

considered a normal, wise business practice. It comes under
the heading of "marketing", not illegal, unfair or deceptive
practices.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any likelihood of
success on the merits. Plaintiff has failed even to
identify or join as a party any consumer who claims to have
been damaged or denied a refund.

This shortcoming is the

subject of a separate motion to dismiss filed by Defendants.
The absence of supporting affidavits is a significant
omission. A hearsay affidavit from one of Plaintiff's
attorneys is not an acceptable substitute.
Defendants contend they operate a legitimate business
which does in fact sell and deliver merchandise to its
customers. The State's conclusory allegations of
"fraudulent telemarketing" practices and "blatant"
misrepresentations of value and quality are an extremely
vague attempt to state a cause of action justifying the
harsh remedy of a preliminary injunction which would in
effect put Trade Winds out of business. In seeking such a
harsh remedy, the State fails to address the fact that Trade
Winds has hundred and hundreds of satisfied customers who
have even written letters to the company thanking and
praising them for the fine merchandise they received.
Defendants know of no individual who failed to receive
the merchandise they shipped or who failed to receive the
written contract.

The State's failure to expressly identify

any of such individuals , despite repeated requests, and the
State's failure to allege exactly what is wrong with
Defendants' contract under the Consumer Solicitation Sales
Act prevents any more meaningful response at this stage of
proceedings. Defendants have commenced discovery and
presumably the State will provide appropriate identities and
particulars at some point in the future.
Defendants dispute the unsupported allegation that they
"virtually assure" anyone that they have in fact won $5,000
or any particular item.

Trade Winds in fact delivers what

it promises by sending customers the promised merchandise.
It is made clear to customers that if they join the Trade
Winds Marketing Club and buy Trade Winds' merchandise, they
will also receive one of five specific awards.
true.

This is

Trade Winds knows of no one who did not receive one

of the awards as promised.

However, customers are clearly

informed that they will receive one and only one of the
awards and it is ludicrous to contend that Trade Winds
informs each customer that he or she has or is likely to
receive the $5,000. Trade Winds furthermore employs various
safeguards, such as follow-up calls by supervisors - before
cashing anyone's check - to make sure that no over-zealous
sales person has given any impression to the contrary.
An examination of Trade Winds' contract will indicate
that it contains all information required by the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act. In fact, Trade Winds' contract
offers a five-day right of cancellation whereas the Statute
requires only three. The contract has Trade Winds' name and
address printed on it and there is room to insert the name
and address of the customer, the terms of the sale and all
other information which we believe is required by the Act.
The State, on the other hand, has simply alleged in
conclusory fashion that Trade Winds has "violated" and
continues to violate the Act "by failing to provide
consumers with a contract which meets the requirements of 32
MRSA §4662." Unless the State can prove to the court
something more specific, we fail to see how there is any
likelihood of success in pursuing this particular
allegation. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the
State has stated or can present a valid case for
misrepresentation under the Unfair Trade Practices Act. If
the quality and value of Defendants' merchandise were not as
claimed, there would undoubtedly be a breach of express and
implied warranties and such claims would be being brought.
The State next claims that the public interest would be
served by granting a preliminary injunction. We

respectfully submit that the public interest is not served
by putting a company out of business and its employees out
of work. This is particularly true when the company has not
first been afforded the basic opportunity to honor its
warranty policy for any dissatisfied customer. Defendants
have been corresponding and cooperating with the Attorney
General's Office since October of 1992, trying to have the
State identify dissatisfied customers or ones who claimed to
have had facts misrepresented to them by individual
telemarketers.

Had such information been disclosed,

Defendants could address the problem in various ways.
Refunds could be given where requested. Employees could be
disciplined or discharged. No such information has ever
been provided by the State and we respectfully submit that
this is a factor to be taken into consideration when
considering the harsh remedy of granting the State a
preliminary injunction shutting down Defendants' business.
The State's allegation that Trade Winds sells "junk
merchandise" is vigorously contested by Defendants.
Defendants believe they sell good products which are
brand new and which are guaranteed.

Customers are free to

reject the merchandise and obtain a refund.

It is not in

the public interest for the Maine Attorney General's Office
to be setting itself up as the arbiter of value nor for it
to be superimposing its opinion of quality and seeking
restitution for customers who haven't asked for it, and in
fact wish to keep the products they received.
The State's claim that irreparable harm will be
sustained is completely unconvincing and unsupported. At
the very least, such a claim should be accompanied by actual
proof that warranties have been breached and refund policies
not honored. Until such time as such a showing has been
made, an allegation of irreparable harm is meaningless. The
State's only argument in this regard is that it is "highly
unlikely" that consumers will be able to obtain restitution
from Defendants' alleged "boiler room operation."

Defendants dispute all implications contained in this
conclusory argument. Defendants further dispute the
meaningless and gratuitous allegation that "the elderly" are
being "preyed upon." Such colorful phraseology, objectively
viewed, adds nothing to the State's burden of proof. Nor is
that burden met or further advanced by such accompanying
vague allusions to Mr. Glidden's "history of association"
with another company. Mr. Glidden runs a bookkeeping
service and the other business referred to was one of his
clients. If Mr. Glidden or Trade Winds is currently
violating any law, the State should be required to prove its
cased with facts and not be relying upon the hope of proving
guilt by association.

DATED:

April 27, 1993

MURPHY & COYNE
93 Lisbon Street
Lewiston, Maine 04240

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV—93—156

STATE OF MAINE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF
v.
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC.,
a Maine corporation, AND
DONALD GLIDDEN,
DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO
DEFENDANT'SOPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION
The State files this Memorandum in support of its reply to
Defendant's opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction in this matter pursuant to M.R. Civ.P.7E.
In both its Complaint and its Motion for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunctive Relief, the State has alleged that
Defendants have engaged in violations of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 and the Consumer Solicitation
Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. § 4662.

Defendants dispute these

allegations and assert that their conduct has violated neither
statute.

The State responds-By~s tat ing rhau it continues to

stand by its initial allegations, and that the matter will
ultimately be resolved by testimonial hearing.

ARGUMENT
I.

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

The State asserts that in the course of conducting their
telemarketing business, Defendants have engaged in a pattern of
misrepresentations to the consumers whom they contact.

These

2

misrepresentations arise in the course of statements made by
Defendant’s employees in their attempts to convince solicited
consumers to send money to Defendants.

The misrepresentations

relate to the nature of the "major award" the consumer is
likely to receive as well as to both the quality of the
merchandise and the quality of the "major awards" used as a
lure to get the consumer to purchase merchandise from the
Defendants.

Defendants obviously dispute the State's

allegations regarding both the quality of the merchandise and
the nature of the representations made concerning the
merchandise.

Defendants also hold up their "100% money back

guarantee" refund policy as an assurance that any dissatisfied
customer would have his or her grievances addressed by
Defendants.

The State alleges in response that the refund

policy, as implemented, is wholly inadequate to redress
consumer 's concerns .

— ------ --------------------- --- —

These are all factual allegations made in direct
contradiction to one another.
support its allegations.

The State has evidence to

The issues are now in a position to

be determined by a trier of fact at a testimonial hearing on
the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

II.

CONSUMER SOLICITATION SALES ACT

Another factual dispute exists as to whether the consumers
who are contacted by Defendants have themselves solicited the

3
contact or if the contact from Defendants is unsolicited.

The

State's position is that the consumers have not solicited the
contact and that the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act therefore
applies.

The State will be prepared to introduce evidence at

the hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction to support
its position on this matter.
Defendants have made passing reference to their apparent
contention that the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act does not
apply here since Defendants are only contacting consumers who
reside outside of the State of Maine.

Since the business

operates within the State, however, its actions are therefore
governed by the Act and it is subject to the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act regardless of the ultimate location of
the consumers whom it solicits.

III. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

See 32 M.R.S.A. § 4662.

-------

The remainder of Defendant's allegations (e.g., the role of
Defendant Donald Glidden) are also essentially questions of
fact which must appropriately be decided at the testimonial
hearing.
As for the breach of warranty theory raised by Defendants,
that simply is not related to the charges brought by the State
in its Complaint.

The alleged violations of the Unfair Trade

Practices Act stem from Defendant's representations concerning
the nature, quality and value of the merchandise as well as

4
representations made concerning the likelihood of winning
particular awards.

The State has not alleged that the

merchandise purchased by consumers is not fit for the purpose
for which it was intended.

The State would be similarly

concerned if an elderly consumer were contacted by telephone
and convinced to purchase for $20,000 a car whose value was
$2,000 —

even if it really does "run good".

CONCLUSION
_^The State has alleged in its Complaint and in its Motion
for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief that Defendants
have violated both the Unfair Trade Practices Act and the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.

Defendants oppose this motion

and dispute the allegations made by the State.

The State

continues to stand by its allegations and will be prepared to
introduce evidence in support of its allegations at the
testimonial hearing before the trier of fact in this matter.

DATED:

\
COLLEEN J . QUI NT
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

/
/
STATE OF MAINE,
/
PLAINTIFF
/

VS

TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC., /
ET AL,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
JOIN NECESSARY PARTIES
(M.R.Civ.P. Rules 12,
19)

/
DEFENDANTS
/

NOW comes the Defendants and move, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(7) to dismiss this action on the grounds that
Plaintiff has failed to join necessary parties and failed to
comply with the provisions of Rule 19 M.R.Civ.P. regarding
stating the reasons for non-joinder of such parties.
In support of this motion, Defendants rely upon the
Memorandum of Law provided herewith and the complaint
already filed by Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the action be
dismissed, and that they be awarded their costs.
DATED:

April 20, 1993

G. Coyne, Jr.
Attorney for Defendants
Murphy & Coyne
93 Lisbon Street, Lewiston, Me

04240
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
PLAINTIFF

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO •

/
/

VS
/
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, INC. ,
ET AL,
/
DEFENDANTS

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

/

Plaintiff's complaint refers to numerous unnamed
"consumers" who have allegedly done business with
Defendants. Plaintiff has not identified any of these
consumers nor joined them in this action. Nor has Plaintiff
stated in its pleading any reasons why such parties are not
joined.
Rule 19(c) M.R.Civ.P. states as follows:
A pleading asserting a claim for relief
shall state the names, if known to the pleader,
of any persons as described in sub-division (a)
(1)— (2) hereof who are not jointed, and the
reasons why they are not joined.
Although Plaintiff's complaint purports to seek relief
on behalf of such unnamed individuals, Plaintiff has made no
attempt to comply with these provisions of the Rule.
Plaintiff has not stated the name of any such person and
Plaintiff has not stated the reasons for not joining such
individuals.
The unnamed individuals clearly are parties
contemplated by Rule 19(a) M.R.Civ.P. According to
Plaintiff's complaint, these are people who were solicited
by telephone by Defendants (Complaint, P.12) who believed
they were going to receive $5,000 from Defendants
(Complaint, P.13), who paid Defendants money in excess of the
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value they received (Complaint, p. 15), and who were
primarily motivated by the expectation of receiving $5,000
instead of merchandise (Complaint, P. 18). Plaintiff
further has alleged that these consumers did not receive
proper written documentation regarding their contract
(Complaint, p. 21) and that certain alleged facts were
misrepresented to these individuals (Complaint, P. 7).
In Plaintiff's prayer for relief, Plaintiff asks for
restitution to each such customer or perhaps even every
customer who has ever done any business with Defendants.
The specific request contained in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's
prayer for relief is that the court, "order Defendants to
pay restitution to each consumer who sent money to
Defendants in response to their solicitation."
Clearly, the individuals mentioned but unidentified by
Plaintiff are people who may or may not have an independent
cause of action against Defendants. Defendants have pointed
out elsewhere their continuing unsuccessful effort to have
Plaintiff disclose the names of unsatisfied customers.
(See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum and Affidavit in Support
of Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte Attachment). To date,
Plaintiff has failed to do so and Defendants therefore have
no way of knowing which customers seek their money back and
which customers wish to keep the items they purchased from
Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff has brought this action
without naming or joining any such individuals and, with a
rather broad brush, asks that Defendants be subjected to
liability for restitution to each and every customer
Defendants have ever done business with.
If in fact certain individuals claim to have been
defrauded by alleged misrepresentations committed by
Defendants, Defendants are exposed to "a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent
obligations" to such individuals and to the Plaintiff in
this action. The Rule in such cases imposes upon Plaintiff
the obligation to name such individuals, if known.
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Presumably, Plaintiff knows the identities of dissatisfied
individuals. The Rule also requires that Plaintiff plead
affirmatively the reasons why such individuals have not been
joined. In this case, Plaintiff has not complied with
either requirement.
As can be seen from Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants' business is conducted on a
"nationwide" basis. (Complaint, p. 2). In State ex rel,
Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981), the Law
Court noted the unfairness and difficulty of forcing an
interstate business to defend suits in fifty states. (436
A.2d at 875). The same principle applies in the present
case. If Plaintiff in this case is seeking restitution on
behalf of unnamed individuals in all other States, those
individuals should either be joined or left to pursue their
own actions. In either event, it is inappropriate for
Plaintiff to purport to represent such individuals without
joining them, without naming them and without explaining
valid reasons for not joining them as is required by the
Rule.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully
submit that the complaint be dismissed.
N
DATED:

April 20, 1993 ,

Coleman G. Coyne, Jr.
Attorney for Defendan
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-93-156

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
PLAINTIFF

/
/

VS
/
TRADE WINDS MARKETING
INC., ET AL,
DEFENDANTS

DEFENDANTS' INTERROGATORIES
PROPOUNDED TO PLAINTIFF

/
/
/

INTRODUCTION
Please note, in these Interrogatories when we say
"you", we mean to include the State of Maine, its agents and
employees, members of the Attorney General's office, and any
other entity who has assisted or participated in any aspect
of this investigation or litigation. For example, if any
Federal Bureau or Agency has contributed in any way, or any
police, Board, Agency or Attorney from any other States.
When we say "who", we are asking you to identify the
individual or individuals by giving her or his name,
residential address, mailing address, telephone number and
date of birth if known to you.
With respect to experts, when we say "who" or ask you
to identify such individuals, we are also asking that you
include the individual's profession, area of expertise, the
subject matter of the expert's testimony, the opinions he or
she has or is expected to express, and the underlying facts
or data supporting the opinion.
When we refer to "this action" or similar words, we are
referring to the law suit filed by the Attorney General's
Office and the various allegations of the complaint.
1. Who are the individuals you claim were called on an
unsolicited basis by Defendants?
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2. Who complained to you about Defendants' practices
without you having solicited or contacted them first?
3. Who did you contact about Defendants' business
practices without them calling or contacting you first?
4. Of individuals you contacted, who expressed no
complaints regarding Defendants' business practices (Meaning
also to include who indicated satisfaction with the goods
received)?
5. Who has complained about the poor quality of goods
received from Defendants?
6. Who has complained that the value of goods received
was not as represented to them?
7.

Who claims to have been promised $5,000?

8. Who denies receiving a follow-up call from a Trade
Winds' supervisor to verify no promise of $5,000 or any
particular award?
9.
cancel?

Who did not receive notice of their right to

10. Who insisted on receiving a refund from Defendants
and was denied?
11. Who are the elderly people referred to in your
complaint and of these, who and how many are mentally
incompetent?
12. What experts have expressed opinions or will
testify regarding the competence or mental confusion of any
of the elderly or other consumers?
13. What experts have expressed any opinions or will
testify regarding the value and quality of Defendants'
merchandise?
14. What experts have expressed opinions or will
testify regarding the telemarketing industry and/or
Defendants' methods of operation?
15. Which customers of Defendants have specifically
asked for restitution?
16. What efforts have been made by any allegedly
damaged consumer (a) to tender the merchandise back to
Defendants and (b) to request restitution?
17.

Which customers do not seek restitution and wish
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to keep the merchandise they received?
18. Of the consumers who contacted you or whom you
contacted, which ones kept notes, memoranda or other
writings regarding their conversations and dealings with
Defendants?
19. Which of Defendants' present or former employees
have you spoken to?
20. Which of Defendants' present or former employees
have provided you statements, either orally or in writing,
and when were such statements given?
21. State what each present or former employee of
Defendants says or claims regarding Defendants' business
practices or any other aspect of this suit.
22. If you contend that the Home Solicitation Sales
Act or any other Act requires that a consumer be given a
completely executed written document before parting with any
money or check, please so indicate and state the basis for
your contention, including the provision of any such act
which you claim so dictates.
23. If you contend that Defendants have done business
with any consumer within the State of Maine, identify each
such consumer.
24. If you contend that the Maine Home Solicitation
Sales Act applies to homes outside the State of Maine, state
the complete basis for your contention and identify any
statutory or other provision which you contend so dictates.
25. If you contend that any individual purported to
exercise her or his right of cancellation and was denied the
opportunity to do so by Defendants, identify all such
individuals and state all of the alleged facts supporting
that contention.
26. Have Defendants been subjected to any videotaping,
wire tapping, surveillance or undercover operation? If so,
describe such actions and identify all individuals who
participated, the dates of such actions and the results.
27. If anyone has complained to you or made a claim of
Defendants having specifically misrepresented facts to them,
identify each such person, the date and content of the
alleged misrepresentation and the specific individual who is
alleged to have made the misrepresentation.
28. With respect to your contention that Defendants
have misrepresented the quality and value of items, state
with respect to each such instance of misrepresentation, the
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exact statement made, the party making it, the party to whom
it was made, and what evidence, expert or otherwise,
supports the contention that the representation was false.
29. Of all individuals contacted or spoken to by you,
who and how many claimed not to have been misled, or not to
have been the object of misrepresentations, and who and how
many in fact expressed praise and/or satisfaction with Trade
Winds?
30. What specific individuals claim to have spoken
personally to Defendant Glidden, either by calling him or by
receiving a call from him regarding any Trade Winds
business, and state each and every date on which said
individual claims to have had such a conversation.
31. If you asked any customer of Defendants, or any
other individual to join in or participate in this suit,
identify each such person and state whether such person
accepted, declined or otherwise indicated any reason for not
participating in this lawsuit as a party, and with respect
to each such person, state his or her position as
communicated to you.
32. Identify each individual employed by Defendants
who you contend "formerly worked as telemarketers at Capital
Advertising."
33. Identify each individual from whom the Attorney
General's Office has received "unsolicited letters" and who
complained regarding Capital Advertising. Also identify any
such individuals who made similar claims against the present
Defendants.
34. In your "Objection to Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte
Attachment," you state, " The State is aware that Defendant
Trade Winds is making an effort to comply with statutory
requirements regarding a consumer's right to cancel." State
what efforts you agree or concede Trade Winds is making in
this regard. You also state that "these efforts
nevertheless fall short of what is required." With regard
to this latter statement, state each and every reason why
these efforts "fall short" and what more you contend
Defendants are required to do in order to comply.
35. In the same document mentioned above, you also
state that Defendants' efforts "fall short" because items
sent to consumers are "neither of the nature or quality as
was represented in the telemarketing sales pitch." State
specifically each and every fact, identifying the
individuals involved, which supports this claim that neither
the quality nor the nature of the goods was as represented.
36.

Who do you contend is the "company's best
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salesman" as mentioned on Page 5 of your Objection to Motion
to Dissolve Ex Parte Attachment and to whom do you contend
this individual spoke?
37. State what you contend to be the value of each
package sent to each particular consumer whom you claim to
represent or for whom you seek restitution. Specifically,
state what each such consumer paid and what the "fraction"
of that amount the goods were actually worth.
(This refers
to Page 6 of the document described above where this phrase
was uised) .
38. If you contend that Defendants have failed to
furnissh to any consumer a completely executed copy of the
contract immediately after the consumer has signed it, state
each such occasion when this allegedly occurred and identify
the consumers involved. If those consumers subsequently
received such a contract, so indicate, and state the date
when it was received. With respect to each such consumer,
state whether or not said consumer was thereafter afforded a
period of at least three days or longer in which to cancel
the contract, and state whether any such consumer purported
to do so. If so, identify each who did.
39. Which consumers did Defendants not inform of their
three-day right to cancel "in a timely manner" as mentioned
on page 9 of your Objection to Motion to Dissolve Ex Parte
order?
40. What material facts were misrepresented to such
individuals regarding the terms and conditions of the sale?
Please be specific with respect to the misrepresentation and
the individual.
41. What false impression was created in which minds,
and by whom?
42. Identify each person interviewed by Colleen Quint,
either as a consumer or as an individual presently or
formerly employed by Defendants as telemarketers. State the
dates on which said individuals spoke to Colleen Quint and
state specifically what each one said.
43. Identify each person who claims to have been told
by Defendants or any of Defendants' employees that Trade
Winds' business is "a mail order catalog company, like Sears
or L. L. Bean." Also state, if known to you, the name of
the individual who supposedly made this statement.
44. State the basis for your statement in Paragraph 11
of the affidavit of Colleen Quint that "during recent
months, Defendants' sales have totaled between $5,000 and
$7,000 per clay." Identify each individual who so claims or
who has provided any information supporting that contention.
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45. Identify the individual referred to in Paragraph
13 of Colleen Quint's affidavit who claims to have witnessed
the alleged actions of Donald Glidden described therein.
46. If any individual claims to have requested his or
her money back and been persuaded to purchase other
merchandise instead, identify each such individual fully.
DATED: April 20, 1993.

'Coleman G.Coyne, Jr.
Attorney for Defendan
Murphy & Coyne
93 Lisbon Street
Lewiston, Me 04240
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.
)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
TRADE WINDS MARKETING, )
INC., AND DONALD GLIDDEN)
)
Defendants
)

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-93-156

STATE OF MAINE,

MOTION FOR DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT (M.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2))

Plaintiff State of Maine respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment by
default against Defendants Trade Winds Marketing , Inc. and Donald Glidden by
reason that Defendants have failed to obey this Court's Order of August 2, 1993 to
appear by new counsel within 30 days of the date of the Order or be defaulted.
Pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, entry of default
judgm ent is proper when "a party against whom judgment for affirmative relief is
sough has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact
is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise". As of the date of this Motion,
Defendants have failed to retain local counsel or otherwise defend the present
action. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to entry of default judgment by the Court
pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 55(a) and (b)(2). An Affidavit in Support of Default
Judgm ent is attached hereto and incorporated herein.
Plaintiff requests that the Court permanently enjoin Defendants, their agents,
assigns, successors, officers, directors, and anyone acting on their behalf or under
their control from:

A.

Violating any provision of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A.

§§206-214;
B.

Violating any provision of the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32

M.R.S.A. §§4661-4671; and
C.

Violating any provision of the Games of Chance Act, 14 M.R.S.A.

§ § 330-346.
Plaintiif also requests that Defendant be ordered to pay to the Department of
Attorney General restitution in the amount of $30,000 to be distributed to
consumers victimized by Defendants' unfair and deceptive practices, money paid by
each consumer.
Finally, Plaintiff requests that Defendants be ordered to pay to the Department
of the Attorney General a civil penalty in the amount of $20,000 for intentional
violations of 5 M.R.S.A. §207 (1989 and Supp. 1993) and $7900 to the State of Maine
for costs of investigation, suit and attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff State of Maine respectfully requests that its Motion
for Default Judgment be granted.
DATED at Augusta, Maine this J o day of December, 1994.

Assistant Attorney General
Public Protection Unit

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.
TRADE WINDS, INC. and,
DONALD GLIDDEN,
Defendants

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-93-156
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Amy M. Homans, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

'

I am the Assistant Attorney General representing Plaintiff in the

above-referenced matter and, as such, I am familiar with the facts of this case.
2.

On March 31, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, Motion for Approval of Ex Parte Attachment, and supporting
documents. Copies of all pleadings were sent to counsel for Defendants , Coleman
G. Coyne, Esq., by placing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.
3.

Defendants responded in a timely manner through counsel to the

Complaint and Motions
4.

On July 30 ,1 9 9 3 , after several months of litigation and negotiations,

counsel for Defendants filed a motion to withdraw. The motion was granted by
Justice Chandler on August 2, 1993.
5.

Justice Chandler's Order mandated that Defendants would be defaulted

if an appearance by substitute counsel was not entered within 30 days of the date of
the Order.

6.

To date, there has been no entry of appearance by substitute counsel

nor have Defendants responded to written communications from the Plaintiff.
7.

Neither Defendant is an infant, incompetent person or in the military

service of the United States as defined by Article I of the Soldiers and Sailors Relief
Act of 1940, as amended.
8.

Venue was properly laid in Kennebec County pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.

§209 (1988 and Supp. 1991).
9.

The cost of bringing this lawsuit which includes the investigation by

the Attorney General, attorneys fees, and costs is in the amount of $ 7900 ($ 80 x 35
hours (AAG Colleen Quint)) and ( $ 100 x 15 hours)(AAG Homans)).
10.

Based upon the Attorney General's investigation of this matter,

including interviews with consumers, review of consumer complaints and an
examination of documents provided to consumers, all consumers who paid money
to Defendants have suffered ascertainable losses within the meaning of 5 M.R.S.A.
§209 (1988 and Supp. 1991) as a result of Defendants' illegal conduct under 5
M.R.S.A. §207 (1988). Restitution in the amount of $30,000 is due to the victims of
Defendants' illegal conduct.
11.

Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §209, Plaintiff further requests that this Court

order Defendants to forfeit and pay to the State of Maine civil penalties in the
amount of $20,000.
I solemnly affirm that the facts set forth in paragraphs 1-11 are true.

Assistant Attorney General

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.
Subscribed and sworn before me.

DATED:

page 3 of 3
Homans affidavit

